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I. INTRODUCTION
On July 1, 2020, the United States Senate unanimously passed
a resolution declaring July 30th as “National Whistleblower
Appreciation Day.”1 This resolution demonstrates our society’s

* Michael Casas, Juris Doctor Candidate 2022, UIC School of Law. Thank
you to my parents for all the love and support they’ve given me throughout my
entire life. I would also like to thank Professor Mark Wojcik for encouraging me
to pursue Law Review and instilling confidence in me to write this case note.
1. See S. Res. 634, 116th Congress (as passed by Senate, July 1, 2020) (“It is
the duty of all persons . . . to give their earlies information to Congress or any
other proper authority of any misconduct, frauds, or misdemeanors.”).
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recognition of the importance of protecting whistleblowers and
encouraging Americans to take action against illicit activity within
public and private organizations.2 Today, the relevance of
whistleblower claims is more prominent than ever. The False
Claims Act (“FCA”),3 which enables whistleblowers to bring
lawsuits against scammers who defraud the federal government,
has seen an upward trend in claims over the past decade, with 801
new lawsuits filed in 2021.4 FCA claims alone have resulted in over
$5.6 billion in settlements for the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) in
2021.5 Approximately eighty-five percent of all FCA recoveries came
from healthcare-related claims.6
The FCA has become even more relevant in 2022. In response
to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Federal Government granted
billions of dollars in funding to the healthcare industry to address
the crisis.7 This substantial increase in funding has given rise to
countless opportunities to defraud the Government and steal a
significant amount of taxpayer money. Thus, it is imperative that
the Government treat every FCA claim with the utmost concern and
provide a thorough examination into the validity and severity of
each claim.
Since 2003, there has been a circuit court split over the
standard of review applied to instances where the Government
seeks to dismiss a whistleblower claim under the FCA.8 The
standards range from requiring the Government to show a rational
2. Sen. Chuck Grassley, Grassley Celebrating Whistleblower Appreciation
Day (July 30, 2020), www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassleycelebrating-whistleblower-appreciation-day
[perma.cc/3DDX-83JR]
(proclaiming,
T]oday, Congress and the American people depend on whistleblowers to
tell us about wrongdoing, just as much as our founding fathers did. In
fact we depend on them more. Because as the government gets bigger,
the potential for fraud and abuse gets bigger. So does the potential for
cruel retaliation against the nation’s brave truth-tellers.).
3. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2022).
4. Michael L. Podberesky et al., Analysis of DOJ’s 2021 FCA Statistics and
the
Trends
Therein,
SUBJECT
TO
INQUIRY.
(Feb.
9,
2022),
www.subjecttoinquiry.com/2022/02/analysis-of-dojs-2021-fca-statistics-andthe-trends-therein/ [perma.cc/6E4X-FF7T].
5, Id.
6. Id. (“The [eighty-five percent of all FCA recoveries] only includes federal
losses, and does not count recoveries for state Medicaid programs where DOJ
provided assistance”).
7. Rachel Cohrs, COVID-19 funding: Where the money goes, MOD.
HEALTHCARE
(Mar.
07,
2020),
www.modernhealthcare.com/politicspolicy/covid-19-funding-where-money-goes
[perma.cc/CR8H-76K7]
(“$2.2
billion to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention . . . Nearly $1 billion
for drugs, medical supplies and training . . . $1 billion in loan subsidies . . . to
help small businesses.”).
8. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2022).
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connection between seeking dismissal and achieving a legitimate
Government objective,9 to giving the Government an unfettered
right of dismissal without providing its justification to do so.10
Following the publication of an internal DOJ memo directing its
attorneys to increase their efforts in dismissing FCA claims, the
whistleblower legal community is now concerned that lenient
dismissal procedures will encourage the Government to dismiss
legitimate claims without thoroughly investigating their merits.11
As such, the competing dismissal standards have set the stage for
contentious disputes between the Government and FCA litigants in
jurisdictions that have not adopted a standard for dismissal. In
August 2020, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in U.S. ex rel.
CIMZNHCA, LLC v. UCB, Inc. et al.12 [hereinafter CIMZNHCA v.
UCB] further deepened the split when the Court established a third
standard for granting the Government’s dismissal of FCA claims.13
This case note will discuss the Seventh Circuit’s ruling in
CIMZNHCA v. UCB14 and will examine the utility of each existing
standard of review for dismissing FCA claims in order to determine
the best approach. Part II will first review the FCA and describe the
procedural mechanism that enables whistleblowers to bring a
lawsuit on behalf of the Government, known as a qui tam15 action.
The following two subsections will examine the Swift16 and Sequoia
Orange17 standards of review for the Government’s right to dismiss
qui tam actions, followed by a discussion of the factual background
and procedural history of CIMZNHCA v. UCB.18 Part III will begin
with a summary of the Seventh Circuit’s solution to a jurisdictional
issue common with FCA claims, followed by an analysis of the
9. U.S. ex rel., Sequoia Orange Co. v. Baird-Neece Packing Corp., 151 F.3d
1139, 1145 (9th Cir. 1998) [hereinafter Sequoia Orange].
10. Swift v. United States, 318 F.3d 250, 252 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
11. Memorandum from Michael D. Granston, Director, Commercial
Litigation Branch, Fraud Section, to Attorneys, Commercial Litigation Branch,
Fraud Section and Assistant U.S. Attorneys Handling False Claims Act Cases,
Offices of the U.S. Attorneys, Factors for Evaluating Dismissal Pursuant to 31
U.S.C. 3730(c)(2)(A), 1-2. (Jan. 10, 2018), www.insidethefca.com/wpcontent/uploads/sites/300/2018/12/Granston-Memo.pdf [perma.cc/HQ7M-D7P5]
[hereinafter Factors for Evaluating Dismissal].
12. U.S. ex rel. CIMZNHCA v. UCB, Inc., 970 F.3d 835 (7th Cir. 2020)
[hereinafter CIMZNHCA II].
13. Id. at 853.
14. Id.
15. Qui Tam Action, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“Qui tam” is
Latin for “qui tam pro domino rege quam pro seipse,” which means “[he] who
sues for the king as for himself.”); see also Randee Fenner, David Freeman
Engstrom on Qui tam, STANFORD L. SCH. (Nov. 12, 2012),
www.law.stanford.edu/stanford-lawyer/articles/david-freemon-engstrom-onqui-tam/ [perma.cc/N7DZ-ZCSZ] (“Qui tam (variously pronounced key tam; key
tom; and kwee tom).”).
16. Swift, 318 F.3d at 252.
17. Sequoia Orange, 151 F.3d at 1147.
18. CIMZNHCA II, 970 F.3d at 839.
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court’s reasoning behind creating a new standard for reviewing the
Government’s dismissal of FCA lawsuits. It will conclude with a
discussion about the consequences of the court’s decision.
Part IV will explore the issues created by the CIMZNHCA
standard, followed by an analysis of how the current standards
comport with the legislative intent behind the FCA. Part IV will
conclude with a proposal for a new standard that involves amending
the text of the FCA to clear the troublesome ambiguity of the statute
that has riddled our court system with contentious litigation.

II. BACKGROUND
A. False Claims Act Overview
The FCA19 was passed by Congress in 1863 as a response to a
widespread fraud perpetrated against the Government during the
Civil War.20
The act contains qui tam provisions, which allow private
citizens to sue on behalf of the Federal Government against
perpetrators who defraud the Government.21 Private individuals
who initiate the lawsuits are known as “relators”22 and are
incentivized23 to bring these types of claims because they are
entitled to a share of the money that the Government recovers.24
In 1943, Congress drastically altered the FCA.25 The changes
incorporated a significant reduction to the relator’s compensation
and created new restrictions to the type of claims that could be
brought.26 The FCA was sparsely used until the mid-1980s when

19. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2022).
20. Roberto M. Braceras, The False Claims Act and Universities: From
Fraud to Compliance, COLL. & UNIV. L. MANUAL § 8:1 (Robert W. Iuliano, 1st
ed. Supp. 2012) (quoting Abraham Lincoln as saying, “Worse than traitors in
arms are the men who pretend loyalty to the flag, feast and fatten on the
misfortunes of the nation while patriotic blood is crimsoning the plains of the
south and their countrymen are moldering in the dust.”).
21. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2022).
22. 78 Am. Jur. 3d, Proof of Facts 3d § 1 (2004).
23. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c) (2022) (“If the Government proceeds with an action,
the relator will receive at least [fifteen] percent but not more than [twenty-five]
percent of the proceeds of the action or settlement of the claim, depending upon
the extent to which the person substantially contributed to the prosecution of
the action.”).
24. 78 Am. Jur. 3d Proof of Facts 3d § 1 (2004).
25. 78 Am. Jur. 3d Proof of Facts 3d § 3 (2004).
26. Id. (recounting,
Whistleblowers could no longer bring claims that were based on evidence
or information that was known to the government at the time the action
was brought. This restriction was not contingent upon whether the
government had any intention of bringing a claim and even if the
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reports of rampant fraud against the Government committed by
high-profile defense contractors became known.27 Congress
responded by passing a bipartisan supported bill that incorporated
amendments to the FCA aimed to encourage whistleblowers to
bring more qui tam actions to combat fraud. 28
The objectives of the FCA amendments can be found in Senate
Report Number 99-345, which explains the intent behind specific
provisions within the statute.29 One of the central goals of the bill
was to expand relator participation in aiding the Government with
combating fraud by increasing incentives and giving the relator a
more prominent role in the litigation.30 Specifically, the relator’s
more active role was meant to ensure the Government did not
dismiss legitimate FCA claims without thoroughly investigating
their merits. The report describes the relator’s role as “a check that
the Government does not neglect evidence, cause undue delay, or
drop the false claims case without legitimate reason.”31 The
amendments to the FCA proved to be remarkably effective. Since
1986, over 13,200 FCA claims have been filed, which has resulted
in the Government recovering more than $55 billion in settlements
and fines.32

B. The Government’s Right to Dismiss Qui Tam Actions
The FCA is codified at 31 U.S.C §§ 3729–3733.33 Section 3730
provides the relevant procedures and rights of the parties to an FCA
lawsuit.34 However, this section provides limited guidance for courts
as to the extent of the Government and the relator’s responsibilities
whistleblower was the original source of the evidence or information.)
27. False Claims Act, PHILLIPS & COHEN, www.phillipsandcohen.com/falseclaims-act-history/ [perma.cc/B5DQ-EYAU] (last visited Oct. 8, 2020)
(recapitulating,
[T]he Department of Defense reported that [forty-five] of the largest [one
hundred] defense contractors — including nine of the top [ten] — were
under investigation for multiple fraud offenses. Government
enforcement agencies, meanwhile, complained that their efforts to
investigate and stop fraud were hamstrung by insufficient resources, a
lack of adequate legal tools and the difficulty of getting individuals with
knowledge of fraud to speak up for fear they would lose their jobs.).
28. 78 Am. Jur. 3d Proof of Facts 3d § 3 (2004).
29. S. Rep. No. 99-345 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. §§ 5266, 5291.
30. Id. (“The bill also allows a qui tam, or private citizen relator, increased
involvement in suits brought by the relator but litigated by the Government.
Additionally, the relator could receive up to [thirty] percent of any judgment
arising from his suit and is afforded protection from retaliation for his actions.”).
31. S.Rep. No. 99–345, at 25–6 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. §§
5266, 5291.
32. False Claims Act, supra note 27.
33. 31 U.S.C §§ 3729–3733 (2022).
34. 31 U.S.C § 3730 (2022).
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in certain circumstances, which has led to dissimilar
interpretations of the FCA’s application.
When a relator brings a qui tam action, the Government must
be served with a copy of the complaint that shall remain sealed for
at least sixty days.35 Before the expiration of the sixty days,36 the
Government may either proceed with the action,37 or decline to take
over the lawsuit, which allows the relator to proceed on its own.38 If
the Government elects to take on the action or decides to intervene
at any point before the Defendant has responded or answered the
complaint, the Government may dismiss the case over the relator’s
objections.39 Pursuant to section 3730(c)(2)(A) of the FCA, once the
Government files a motion to dismiss, the court must “provide[] the
[relator] with an opportunity for a hearing on the motion.”40
Aside from this plain language, the FCA is silent on any
further instruction for courts as to what the relator is allowed to
object to, or the standard courts should follow when reviewing these
motions. Without clear guidance from Congress, courts have relied
on two different common law standards for analyzing whether
dismissal of an FCA claim is proper.

C. Competing Standards of Review for Dismissal of
FCA Claims
Since 2003, two federal circuits have created different
standards of review for determining whether the Government is
entitled to dismiss an FCA action brought on its behalf by a relator.
The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the FCA requires the
Government to show a legitimate reason for seeking dismissal41
while the D.C. Circuit reads the FCA as giving the Government an
unrestricted right to dismiss claims without providing
justification.42 Because the vast majority of federal jurisdictions
have not adopted a standard of review for dismissal, the early
stages of FCA litigation in these circuits often involve disputes over
which rule should apply.

35. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (2022).
36. See State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. U.S. ex rel. Rigsby, 137 S. Ct. 436,
443 (2016) (confirming that the purpose of the seal provision is to allow the
Government to conduct a potential criminal investigation without putting
defendant(s) on notice).
37. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4)(A) (2022).
38. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4)(B) (2022).
39. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A) (2022).
40. Id.
41. Sequoia Orange, 151 F.3d at 1145.
42. Swift, 318 F.3d at 250.
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1. Sequoia Orange Standard
The first standard of review emerged in 1998 from the Ninth
Circuit’s decision United States of America Ex Rel. Sequoia Orange
Co. v. Baird-Neece Packing Corp.43 This standard interprets the
hearing requirement of 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A)44 to compel courts
to review the dismissal of the action when a motion to dismiss is
submitted.45 Thus, the Ninth Circuit determined that in order to
dismiss an FCA claim, the Government must show (1) “a valid
Government purpose” and (2) a “rational relation between dismissal
and accomplishment of the purpose” before dismissal may be
granted.46 If satisfied, the burden shifts “to the relator ‘to
demonstrate that dismissal is fraudulent, arbitrary and capricious,
or illegal.’”47 This rational relation test has subsequently been
adopted by the Tenth Circuit, following the court’s decision in
Ridenour v. Kaiser-Hill Co.48

2. Swift Standard
However, in the 2003 decision of Swift v. United States, the
D.C. Circuit specifically rejected the standard set forth in Sequoia
Orange.49 The Swift court interpreted 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A) as
giving the Executive Branch an “unfettered right” 50 to dismiss a qui
tam action, which is not subject to judicial review.51 The D.C. Circuit
explained that this standard “is also consistent with Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Rule 41(a)(1)(i) permits a plaintiff to dismiss a
civil action ‘without order of the court’ if the adverse party has not
yet filed an answer or a motion for summary judgment.”52 This
43. Sequoia Orange, 151 F.3d at 1145.
44. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A) (2022) (“The Government may dismiss the
action notwithstanding the objections of the person initiating the action if the
person has been notified by the Government of the filing of the motion and the
court has provided the person with an opportunity for a hearing on the
motion.”).
45. Sequoia Orange, 151 F.3d at 1144.
46. Id. at 1145.
47. Id.
48. Ridenour v. Kaiser-Hill Co., 397 F.3d 925, 936 (10th Cir. 2005) (“In our
view, [the Sequoia Orange standard] recognizes the constitutional prerogative
of the Government under the Take Care Clause, comports with legislative
history, and protects the rights of relators to judicial review of a government
motion to dismiss.”).
49. Swift, 318 F.3d at 252.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 253 (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 831, 105 S. Ct. at 1655
(“The Constitution entrusts the Executive with duty to ‘take Care that the Laws
be faithfully executed.’ U.S. CONST., art. II, § 3. The decision whether to bring
an action on behalf of the United States is therefore ‘a decision generally
committed to [the government’s] absolute discretion.’”)).
52. Swift, 318 F.3d at 252.
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standard directly conflicts with Sequoia Orange53 because it gives
great latitude to the Government’s decision to dismiss a case and
does not require the Government to provide any justification for its
reason in doing so.54

D. The Granston Memo
In the past several years, the frequency of FCA claims has been
steadily increasing.55 With a concern for the Government’s time and
resources, in January 2018, Michael Granston, the Director of the
Civil Fraud Section of the Commerce Litigation Branch of the
Department of Justice, published an internal memo that set out to
encourage DOJ attorneys to pursue the dismissal of FCA claims
much more frequently.56 The purpose of Granston’s memo was to
“advance the government’s interests, preserve limited resources,
and avoid adverse precedent.”57 The memo lays out a list of seven
factors that DOJ attorneys should take into consideration when
moving to dismiss an FCA claim.58
The DOJ has pursued dismissal in fifty FCA cases since the
publication of the memo in early 2018, which is more than it
targeted for dismissal in the prior thirty years combined.59 The
factors most often cited to support the Government’s Section
3730(c)(2)(A) motions to dismiss have been preservation of
government resources, curbing meritless claims, and preventing the
interference with agency policies.60
53. Sequoia Orange, 151 F.3d at 1145.
54. Swift, 318 F.3d at 250.
55. See 2019 Year-End False Claims Act Update, GIBSON DUNN (Jan. 31,
2020),
www.gibsondunn.com/2019-year-end-false-claims-act-update/
[perma.cc/ZXV4-V9Y7] (reporting 2019 marked the tenth consecutive year that
over 700 new FCA matters were initiated).
56. Factors for Evaluating Dismissal, supra note 11, at 1-2.
57. Id. at 2.
58. Id. at 2-7 (listing the reasons that should be considered for seeking a
dismissal in FCA claims, “1. Curbing Meritless Qui Tams . . . 2. Prevent
parasitic or opportunistic qui tam actions . . . 3. Prevent interference with
agency policies and programs . . . 4. Control litigation brought on behalf of the
United States . . . 5. Safeguard classified information and national security
interests . . . 6. Preserve Government resources . . . 7. Address egregious
procedural errors”).
59. Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Ethan P. Davis, Speech at
the United States Chamber of Commerce’s Institute for Legal Reform (June 26,
2020) (transcript available at www.justice.gov/civil/speech/principal-deputyassistant-attorney-general-ethan-p-davis-delivers-remarks-false-claims
[perma.cc/4AKE-U77R]).
60. Eric Christofferson et al., INSIGHT: Consequences of DOJ’S Granston
Memo – Dismissals Are Up, Circuits Split, BLOOMBERG L. (Nov. 25, 2019),
www.news.bloomberglaw.com/health-law-and-business/insight-consequencesof-dojs-granston-memo-dismissals-are-up-circuits-split [perma.cc/AN7E-YLJD]
(“[T]he government has cited three of the Granston factors most often:
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The repercussions of the Granston memo have presented both
opportunities and risks for FCA litigants as they consider filing qui
tam actions.61 The exposure of the Government’s checklist of factors
for considering dismissal of FCA claims allows practitioners to
address these factors head on, which helps them to make their case
for why their claims hold merit. However, the memo clearly
illustrates the DOJ’s strong position to actively pursue the
dismissal of FCA claims, with an emphasis on preserving
Government resources.62
With the continual rise in FCA claims63 and the Government’s
increased use of its dismissal authority,64 the stage has been set for
a battle in the courts over the validity of whistleblower claims. In
the Granston Memo, the Government directs DOJ attorneys to
encourage courts to apply the Swift standard of dismissal, which
provides the Government an “unfettered right”65 to dismiss qui tam
actions.66 In addition, the Granston Memo advises DOJ attorneys
to argue the Sequoia Orange67 standard adopted by the Ninth and
Tenth circuits was intended to be highly deferential to the
Government.68 The opposing views of the Government and FCA
practitioners have paved the way for many contentious disputes
over the Government’s right to dismiss FCA claims across the
country, especially in jurisdictions that have not adopted one of the
two competing standards.

E. Procedural History of CIMZNHCA v. UCB
1. Factual Background
This conflict over the interpretation of the FCA came to a head

preservation of government resources (cited [one hundred percent] of the time);
curbing meritless qui tams (cited about [eighty percent] of the time); and
preventing interference with agency policies and programs (cited about [fifty
percent] of the time.”).
61. Factors for Evaluating Dismissal, supra note 11 at 1.
62. Id.
63. See 2019 Year-End False Claims Act Update, supra note 55 (reporting
“[m]ore than 780 new FCA matters were initiated in 2019, marking the tenth
year in a row in which over 700 new FCA cases were filed”).
64. See Davis, supra note 59 (“[During the thirty years before the Granston
Memo, the government moved to dismiss roughly 45 qui tam cases; in the twoplus years following the memo, the Department has moved to dismiss around
50 qui tams”)
65. Swift, 318 F.3d at 252.
66. See Factors for Evaluating Dismissal, supra note 11, at 7 (espousing the
opinion that Swift offers the correct standard of review for dismissal of FCA
claims and encouraging DOJ attorneys to argue the Government’s basis for
dismissal “satisfies any potential standard for dismissal under [the FCA]”).
67. Sequoia Orange, 151 F.3d at 1145.
68. Factors for Evaluating Dismissal, supra note 11, at 7.

2022]

CIMZNHCA v. UCB

462

in the 2020 case CIMZNHCA v. UCB,69 where a disagreement over
the dismissal of an FCA claim lead to a fight over which dismissal
standard should be applied in the Southern District of Illinois since
this jurisdiction had yet to adopt one.
Venari Partners, LLC (d/b/a The National Healthcare Analysis
Group or “NHCA Group”) was founded on a unique, lucrative idea:
a data analytics company funded by private investors that’s sole
purpose was to expose healthcare fraud against the Government
through FCA claims and profit off the company’s share of recovered
funds.70 The rationale behind the company’s inception was that
lone whistleblowers tend to be reluctant to come forward and are
often poorly equipped to build a winnable case.71 With a large
financial incentive72 and a professional team of analysts, lawyers,
and health industry insiders, the NHCA Group’s business model
showed great potential.
In 2017, the NHCA Group began a new strategy to find
fraudsters in violation of the FCA.73 By compiling a database
consisting of publicly available resumes of healthcare workers,
NHCA Group created a list of “potential informants” of which they
hoped would aid it in uncovering a fraudulent scheme against the
Government.74 The NHCA Group then contacted these individuals
offering to pay them to participate in a research study of the
pharmaceutical industry.75 Using information obtained through
these interviews, the NHCA Group uncovered an alleged plot
perpetrated by thirty-eight companies76 in the pharmaceutical
industry involving “remuneration in the form of free nursing and

69. U.S. ex rel. CIMZNHCA, LLC v. UCB, INC., 2019 WL 1598109, at *1
(S.D. Ill. Apr. 15, 2019), rev’d and remanded sub nom. U.S. v. UCB, Inc., 970
F.3d 835 (7th Cir. 2020) [hereinafter CIMZNHCA I].
70. See J.C. Herz, Medicare Scammers Steal $60 Billion a Year. This Man
Is Hunting Them, WIRED (Mar. 7, 2016), www.wired.com/2016/03/johnmininno-medicare/ [perma.cc/KYW2-FRP6] (reporting on the story of NHCA
Group’s inception and the methods the company uses to detect potential FCA
claims).
71. Id.
72. Press Release, Department of Justice, Justice Department Recovers over
$3 Billion from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2019 (Jan. 9, 2020),
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-3-billion-falseclaims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2019 [perma.cc/D54Y-TRNM] (“The Department of
Justice obtained more than $3 billion in settlements and judgments from civil
cases involving fraud and false claims against the government in the fiscal year
ending Sept. 30, 2019.”).
73. Herz, supra note 70.
74. Mot. to Dismiss at 5, U.S., et al. ex rel. Healthcare Choice Group, LLC v.
Bayer Corp., 2018 WL 3637381 (E.D. Tex. 2018) (No. 5:17-CV-126-RWS-CMC).
75. Id.
76. Allison Frankel, DOJ doubles down in brief to discredit ‘Wall Streetbacked’ False Claims Act whistleblower, REUTERS (Feb. 25, 2019),
uk.reuters.com/article/us-otc-fca-idUKKCN1QE2IX [perma.cc/FN2A-3YFS].
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reimbursement support services to prescribing providers.”77 In
return, providers would recommend the various companies’ drugs
to patients.78
NHCA Group subsequently created eleven shell companies
exclusively for the purpose of bringing eleven identical qui tam
actions against several combinations of the thirty-eight companies
accused of wrongdoing.79 On July 20, 2017, CIMZNHCA, LLC, one
of the eleven shell companies, filed this False Claims Act suit in the
Southern District of Illinois against UCB, Inc. (“UCB”) and other
pharmaceutical companies alleging these companies used the
aforementioned scheme to entice providers to recommend one of
UCB’s medications, Cimzia, to their patients.80
CIMZNHCA alleges that pharmacies across the country have
engaged in this scheme and submitted false claims to Medicare and
Medicaid, which have “caus[ed] these programs to pay tens of
millions of dollars in improper reimbursements.”81 After a
perfunctory investigation, the Government decided to submit a
motion to dismiss the case.82 The Government reasoned that NHCA
Group’s sweeping allegations of nationwide misconduct (which
would implicate thousands of healthcare professionals and
potentially millions of Medicare beneficiaries) was too “costly and
contrary to governmental prerogatives.”83

2. The District Court’s Analysis of the
Government’s Motion to Dismiss
The District Court for the Southern District of Illinois first
considered which standard of review to follow for analyzing the
Government’s motion to dismiss this FCA claim84 since a dismissal
standard had not yet been adopted in the Seventh Circuit.85 After
reviewing the standards set forth in Swift86 and Sequoia Orange,87
the district court chose to adopt the Sequoia Orange88 standard. In

77. CIMZNHCA I, 2019 WL 1598109 at *1.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A) (2022).
85. CIMZNHCA I, 2019 WL 1598109, at *2.
86. See Swift, 318 F.3d at 252 (reading “[section] 3730(c)(2)(A) [as] giv[ing]
the government an unfettered right to dismiss an action.”).
87. See Sequoia Orange, 151 F.3d at 1145 (explaining that “two step analysis
applies here to test the justification for dismissal: (1) identification of a valid
government purpose; and (2) a rational relation between dismissal and
accomplishment of the purpose”).
88. Sequoia Orange, 151 F.3d at 1145.
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the court’s view, the Sequoia Orange89 standard correctly gave effect
to the hearing requirement of 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A),90 which the
court agreed, compels judicial review for the dismissal of FCA
actions.91 This hearing requirement remains one of the most heavily
contested provisions of the FCA.92
Applying the Sequoia Orange “rational relation”93 test to the
Government’s arguments, the district court agreed that avoiding
litigation costs is a valid interest to support dismissal.94 However,
the court concluded that simply identifying an interest to satisfy
Sequoia Orange95 is not enough to warrant dismissal.96 The court
held that the decision to dismiss the action “must have been based
on a minimally adequate investigation, including a meaningful costbenefit analysis,”97 to satisfy the rational relation test. Indeed, the
court’s finding is consistent with the provision of the FCA which
requires the government to “diligently [ ] investigate” the relators
claims.98 Notably, this requirement is void from the Swift99

89. Id.
90. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A) (2022).
91. CIMZNHCA I, 2019 WL 1598109, at *2 (citing Corley v. United States,
556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009) (quoting Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004)
(“[T]he Sequoia Orange standard is consistent with a well-established principle
of statutory construction: ‘[O]ne of the most basic interpretive canons [is] that
‘[a] statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so
that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant . . . .’”))).
92. See U.S. ex rel. Borzilleri v. AbbVie, Inc., 2020 WL 7039048, at *2 (2d
Cir. 2020) (rejecting the relator’s argument that it was entitled to an evidentiary
hearing because the relator “failed to make a colorable showing that the
government’s dismissal was fraudulent, arbitrary, capricious, or illegal.”); cf.
S.D. Miss. May 11, 2020); U.S. ex rel. Maldonado v. Ball Homes, LLC, No. CV
5:17-379-DCR, 2018 WL 3213614, at *4 (holding the hearing requirement of
section 3730(c)(2)(A) does not require that the relator “be permitted to introduce
evidence.”); see also U.S. ex rel. May v. City of Dall., No. 3:13-CV-4194-N-BN,
2014 WL 5454819, at *4 (holding that providing the relator an opportunity to
respond to the Government’s motion to dismiss satisfies the hearing
requirement; see also U.S. ex rel. Schneider v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, Natl.
Assn., 140 S. Ct. 2660 (2020) (denying a petition for writ of certiorari that would
determine whether the Government is entitled to an unfettered right of
dismissal for qui tam actions under the FCA, or if the relator should be given
an opportunity to persuade the court that the Government’s decision to dismiss
should denied).
93. Sequoia Orange, 151 F.3d at 1145.
94. CIMZNHCA I, 2019 WL 1598109, at *3; see also Sequoia Orange, 151
F.3d at 1146 (explaining that “the government can legitimately consider the
burden imposed on the taxpayers by its litigation, and that, even if the relators
were to litigate the FCA claims, the government would continue to incur
enormous internal staff costs.”).
95. Sequoia Orange, 151 F.3d at 1145.
96. CIMZNHCA I, 2019 WL 1598109, at *3.
97. Id. at *3.
98. 31 USC § 3730(a) (2022).
99. Swift, 318 F.3d at 252.
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standard of review and is a significant issue that would be
addressed by the Seventh Circuit on appeal.
After reviewing the record, the court found the Government’s
investigation inadequate “to support the claimed governmental
purpose,”100 a finding that the Seventh Circuit would subsequently
disagree with.101 Evaluating whether the Government has
adequately considered, or even should consider, the relator’s claim
is the genesis of much debate around the FCA and will be discussed
in depth in the following section. Ultimately, the district court held
that the Government’s express interest was not rationally related
to its decision to dismiss the case.102
The court also took issue with the fact that the Government
devoted 6.5 pages of its briefing and all of its exhibits to disparage
the NHCA Group’s business model and litigation activities.103 The
court found that “one could reasonably conclude that the proffered
reasons for the decision to dismiss are pretextual and the
Government’s true motivation is animus towards the relator.”104
Again, this duty to thoroughly investigate FCA claims has been
consistently shown to be a significant factor in courts’ assessment
of the dismissal of these claims and will become an important
feature towards fixing the debate around the proper dismissal
standard for FCA lawsuits.
Consequently, the Government’s motion to dismiss was

100. CIMZNHCA, 2019 WL 1598109, at *3 (recounting,
During the evidentiary hearing, the Government acknowledged
that, for the most part, it collectively investigated the eleven qui
tam cases filed by the relator. As it relates to this specific case, the
Government reviewed the Complaint and disclosure materials
attached to the Complaint. It did not review any additional
materials from the relator relevant to this case. Nor did the
Government effort a cost-benefit analysis; it did not assess or
analyze the costs it would likely incur versus the potential recovery
that would flow to the Government if this case were to proceed.
This falls short of a minimally adequate investigation to support
the claimed governmental purpose. (internal citations omitted)).
101. CIMZNHCA II, 970 F.3d at 845.
102. CIMZNHCA I, 2019 WL 1598109, at *3-4 (opining,
The relator alleges the in-kind remuneration the defendants provided
to physicians was intended to skew their decision making and to
incentivize them to prescribe Cimzia rather than competitors'
medications. The Government’s contention that these allegations –
which they acknowledge assert a classic violation of the AKS – “conflict
with important policy and enforcement prerogatives of the
Government’s healthcare programs” is curious at best. (internal
citations omitted)).
103. Id. at *4.
104. Id.
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denied.105 Following the court’s order, the Government appealed the
decision arguing that Swift,106 not Sequoia Orange,107 is the
appropriate standard and that it had satisfied its burden of
justifying dismissal, irrespective of the court’s standard of review.108
The following section will examine the Seventh Circuit’s
reversal of the district court’s decision and explore why the Seventh
Circuit decided to create a third standard of review for dismissing
FCA claims in order to make its ruling.

III. ANALYSIS
Before the Seventh Circuit could address the issue of whether
the Government was entitled to the dismissal of CIMZNHCA’s qui
tam suit, the court was first tasked with addressing whether it had
jurisdiction to review the denial of a dismissal that came from a
non-party to the suit.109 To overcome this problem, the court
interpreted 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A)110 as requiring the
Government to intervene in an FCA action before it may seek
dismissal.111 Once the Government has become a party to the suit,
the court determined the Government’s rights to dismiss the claim
are governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a).112 Thus, the
court effectively created a new standard of review for the
Government’s dismissals of qui tam claims.113 This new standard
generally gives the Government an unrestricted right to dismissal,
unless its conduct encroaches on the FCA statute, the Federal
Rules, or the Constitution.114 The following discussion of the
Seventh Circuit’s anfractuous twenty-one page opinion illustrates
the problems arising out of another attempt to interpret the vague
provisions of the FCA, and highlights the need for a simple unified
standard of review that will streamline litigation and avoid arduous
statutory interpretation.

105. Id.
106. Swift, 318 F.3d at 252.
107. Sequoia Orange, 151 F.3d at 1145.
108. CIMZNHCA II, 970 F.3d at 840.
109. Id. at 842.
110. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A) (2022).
111. CIMZNHCA II, 970 F.3d at 844.
112. Id. at 849; Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i) (2022) (“the plaintiff may
dismiss an action without a court order by filing a notice of dismissal before the
opposing party serves either an answer or a motion for summary judgment”);
see also Cone v. W. Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 330 U.S. 212, 217 (1947)
(explaining a plaintiff’s unqualified right to dismissal is preserved by Rule
41(a)(1)).
113. Id. at 840.
114. Id. at 854.
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A. Jurisdictional Issue
Before the Seventh Circuit addressed the merits of the case,
the Court tasked itself with establishing proper appellate
jurisdiction to review the DOJ’s motion to dismiss.115 The Court
decided it had to solve the issue of how it could be authorized to
review the denial of a non-party’s motion to dismiss another’s
lawsuit.116 Notably, this issue was not addressed nor contemplated
by the Swift117 or Sequoia Orange118 courts. The Seventh Circuit’s
decision to take on an issue that only it perceived as necessary to
solve, results in a novel statutory construction of the FCA that
produces a third standard of review for dismissals.
The Seventh Circuit began its analysis by noting that appellate
courts have “jurisdiction of the district courts’ final judgements
under [section] 1291 and several categories of interlocutory orders
under [section] 1292.”119 Denials of a motion to dismiss are
generally not considered final judgments and therefore are not
appealable.120 Despite that, the collateral order doctrine121 provides
“a circuit court may review certain orders as appealable final

115. Id. at 842.
116. CIMZNHCA I, 2019 WL 1598109, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 15, 2019) (“The
Government has declined to intervene and now moves to dismiss the case”).
117. See generally Swift, 318 F.3d 250 (neglecting to address the
Government’s authority to dismiss a qui tam action as a non-party to the suit).
118. See generally Sequoia Orange, 151 F.3d 1139 (neglecting to address the
Government’s authority to dismiss a qui tam action as a non-party to the suit).
119. CIMZNHCA II, 970 F.3d at 842. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2022)
(stating
The courts of appeals (other than the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final
decisions of the district courts of the United States . . . except where a
direct review may be had in the Supreme Court. The jurisdiction of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall be limited
to the jurisdiction described in sections 1292(c) and (d) and 1295 of this
title.)
See also In re Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 482 B.R. 792, 797 (E.D. Wis.
2012), aff’d on other grounds sub nom. Archdiocese of Milwaukee v. Doe, 743
F.3d 1101 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Interlocutory appeal is appropriate when it involves
a controlling question of law over which there is a substantial ground for
difference of opinion, and an immediate appeal from the order may materially
advance the termination of the litigation.”).
120. Jackson v. Curry, 888 F.3d 259, 262 (7th Cir. 2018); accord Chasser v.
Achille Lauro Lines, 844 F.2d 50, 52 (2d Cir. 1988), aff’d sub nom. Lauro Lines
s.r.l. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495 (1989) (explaining that a case is still pending after
a denial of a motion to dismiss and is therefore not considered a final decision).
121. Gray v. Baker, 399 F.3d 1241, 1245 (10th Cir. 2005) (“To establish
jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine, defendants must establish that
the district court's order (1) conclusively determined the disputed question, (2)
resolved an important issue completely separate from the merits of the case,
and (3) is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.”).
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decisions within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 even though the
district court has not entered a final judgment.”122 However, the
Supreme Court has ruled that the “class of [appealable collateral]
orders must remain ‘narrow and selective.’”123
Consequently, two weeks before this lawsuit, the Ninth Circuit
in United States ex rel. Thrower v. Academy Mortgage Corp,
determined that an order denying a motion to dismiss under section
3730(c)(2)(A)124 of the FCA is not an appealable collateral order.125
Therefore, rather than undermine the Ninth Circuit’s decision, the
Seventh Circuit in the present case tasked itself with finding new
grounds for reviewing the order denying the Government’s motion
to dismiss.
The Government argued that the Supreme Court in U.S. ex.
rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York126 had already resolved this
jurisdictional issue.127 The Supreme Court in Eisenstein held the
Government is not a “party to an FCA action for the purposes of the
appellate filing deadline,” unless it intervenes.128 However, even if
the Government has not intervened, it may appeal orders
considered reviewable under the collateral-order doctrine.129 The
Eisenstein Court provided examples of appealable collateral orders
in FCA actions, such as the Government’s ability to appeal a denial
to intervene as well as the dismissal of the FCA action over the
Government’s objections.130 The Government argued that a court’s
order denying a motion to dismiss should not be distinguished from
the examples in Eisenstein.131 Although the Seventh Circuit found
this argument unpersuasive, the Court felt that Eisenstein
122. Henderson v. Glanz, 813 F.3d 938, 947 (10th Cir. 2015); see Digital
Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 871 (1994) ) (citing Abney v.
U. S., 431 U.S. 651 (1977) (“[O]rders denying certain immunities are strong
candidates” for interlocutory appeals)), Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511
(1985)); See also Swint v. Chambers County Comm’n., 514 U.S. 35, 42 (1995)
(noting the “small category” of interlocutory appeals “includes only decisions
that are conclusive, that resolve important questions separate from the merits,
and that are effectively unreviewable on appeal from the final judgment in the
underlying action.”).
123. Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 113 (2009)
(quoting Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 350 (2006)).
124. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A) (2022).
125. United States ex rel. Thrower v. Academy Mortgage Corp., 968 F.3d
996, 1008 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding the Government's interest in dismissing an
action for the purpose of “avoiding burdensome discovery expenses . . . [was] not
an interest important enough to merit expanding narrow scope of collateral
order doctrine”).
126. U.S. ex. rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York, 556 U.S. 928 (2009).
127. CIMZNHCA II, 970 F.3d at 842.
128. Eisenstein, 556 U.S. at 931 (internal quotations omitted).
129. Id. at 931 n.2 (citing Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337
U.S. 541 (1949)).
130. Eisenstein, 556 U.S. at 931 n.2.
131. CIMZNHCA II, 970 F.3d at 842-43.
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“indicate[s] the correct path to solving the jurisdictional problem:
treat the government’s motion to dismiss as a motion both to
intervene and to dismiss.”132
The Seventh Circuit explained, “[a]n intervenor comes between
the original parties to ongoing litigation and interposes between
them its claim, interest, or right, which may be adverse to either or
both of them.”133 In effect, the Government’s motion to dismiss was
an attempt to assert its statutory right134 to end a lawsuit that was
initiated on its behalf. Therefore, the Seventh Circuit considered
the district court’s order denying “the motion to dismiss as an order
denying a motion to intervene” and concluded that it had
jurisdiction to review the order.135 By choosing this route to
rationalize its authority, the Seventh Circuit forced itself down a
byzantine path of statutory construction for the purpose of
analyzing the merits of this case, a path which strays from the
existing authority from Swift136 and Sequoia Orange.137 Before the
court could apply its novel interpretation of requiring Government
intervention before dismissal, the court turned to the text of the
FCA and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to legitimize its
analysis and created a new dismissal standard along the way.

B. The Text of § 3730(c)(2) Requires Intervention Before
the Government May Exercise its Rights.
The Seventh Circuit begins its path to a new standard of
review with subsection (c) of Section 3730 titled, “Rights of the
parties to qui tam actions.”138 As the Supreme Court ruled in
Eisenstein, the Government becomes a party to a qui tam action
when “it intervenes in accordance with the procedures established
by federal law.”139 Paragraph (2)140 is of primary relevance here at
it gives the Government the right to dismiss the action.141 However,
unlike the rest of the paragraphs in this subsection, there is no
procedural posture that signals when the Government may exercise
132. Id. at 843.
133. Id.
134. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A) (2022) (“The Government may dismiss the
action notwithstanding the objections of the person initiating the action if the
person has been notified by the Government of the filing of the motion and the
court has provided the person with an opportunity for a hearing on the
motion.”).
135. CIMZNHCA II, 970 F.3d at 842 (“In substance, the government appeals
a denial of what should be deemed a motion to intervene and then to dismiss. It
is well established that denials of motions to intervene are appealable.”).
136. Swift, 318 F.3d at 252.
137. Sequoia Orange, 151 F.3d at 1147.
138. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(1) (2022).
139. Eisenstein, 556 U.S. at 933.
140. 31 U.S.C. § 3730©(2) (2022).
141. Id.
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this right.142 In order to justify the court’s authority to review an
order against the Government’s decision to dismiss an FCA claim,
the Seventh Circuit proceeds to bend over backward to construct a
novel interpretation of the FCA that comports with its conclusion
that requires Government intervention before seeking dismissal.
The Court focuses on the subparagraphs of paragraph (2)
which it argues, infers Government intervention before it may
exercise its rights.143 For example, “subparagraph (C) provides
‘limitations’ on the relator’s participation where its ‘unrestricted
participation . . . would interfere with or unduly delay the
Government’s prosecution of the case.’”144 The court reasoned this
subparagraph explicitly requires the Government’s participation,
which naturally may only occur after the Government intervenes.145
Along these same lines, the Seventh Circuit took issue with the
D.C. Circuit’s analysis in Swift, which held paragraph (c)(2)—the
paragraph that gives the Government an unqualified right to
dismiss the action—“is not constrained by” the rest of subsection
(C).146 According to the Seventh Circuit, the Swift court’s
interpretation would render the following provisions under
subsection (c) irrelevant. Specifically, paragraph (4) begins with
“[w]hether or not the Government proceeds with the action.”147 If
intervention is not required, the Court reasoned, it would not have
made sense to qualify the provision in this way.148 Additionally, the
Seventh Circuit points out that if an intervention were not required
under paragraph (c)(2), the stipulation of paragraph (c)(1) that the
relator “shall have the right to continue as a party to the action,
subject to the limitations set forth in paragraph (2),” would be
rendered inconsequential.149 Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit
concluded that the text of section 3730(c)(2)150 supports the notion
of requiring Government intervention before it seeks dismissal.151
The ambiguity of the FCA’s text leads to a myriad of
interpretations and takes the court on a lengthy and circuitous
discussion about the text of the FCA as well as constitutional doubts

142. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2) (2022).
143. CIMZNHCA II, 970 F.3d at 845.
144. Id. (quoting, 28 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(C)).
145. CIMZNHCA II, 970 F.3d at 845.
146. Id. at 844 (quoting Swift, 318 F.3d at 252).
147. 31 U.S.C § 3730(c)(4) (2022).
148. CIMZNHCA II, 970 F.3d at 845.
149. Id. at 844-45 (quoting 31 U.S.C § 3730(c)(1) (2022)).
150. 31 U.S.C § 3730(c)(2) (2022).
151. CIMZNHCA II, 970 F.3d at 849.
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raised by the Tenth152 and Ninth153 Circuits which take up
approximately five pages of the opinion.154 This illustrates the
inherent problem with the FCA, in that Congress’ lack of procedural
specificity has led to countless hours and resources debating the
correct interpretation. One reading of this labyrinthine opinion
invokes the reader to believe there must be an easier way to decide
how to apply the FCA in these circumstances.

C. The Seventh Circuit’s “CIMZNHCA” Standard
With the jurisdictional and constitutional issues put to rest,
the Seventh Circuit moved on to adjudicating the real issue of this
case: whether the Government was entitled to dismiss the qui tam
action brought by CIMZNHCA, LLC.155 Having interpreted the text
of section 3730(c)(2)(A)156 as requiring intervention before
dismissal, the Seventh Circuit determined that the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure offer the proper standard for determining the
merits of dismissal.157
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i) enables a
plaintiff to dismiss an action with “a notice of dismissal before the
opposing party serves either an answer or a motion for summary
judgment.”158 The Government met this requirement in the case at
hand by filing a timely motion to dismiss.159 However, because Rule
41(a)160 does not allow an intervenor-plaintiff to prevent dismissal
of the original plaintiff’s claims,161 and because the Rule is “[s]ubject
to . . . any applicable statute,” the court turned to the text of section
3730(c)(2)(A)162 itself for further guidance.163
This section provides “[t]he Government may dismiss the
action, notwithstanding the objections of the [relator]” if the relator

152. Ridenour, 397 F.3d at 934 (“[T]o condition the Government’s right to
move to dismiss an action in which it did not initially intervene upon a
requirement of late intervention tied to a showing of good cause would place the
FCA on constitutionally unsteady ground.”).
153. U.S. ex rel. Kelly v. Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 743, 753 n.10 (9th Cir. 1993)
(explaining that because the statute does not prohibit the Government
dismissing an FCA claim without intervention, allowing it to do so is “entirely
appropriate and provides an illustration of the meaningful control which the
Executive Branch can exercise over qui tam actions”).
154. CIMZNHCA II, 970 F.3d at 844-49.
155. Id. at 849.
156. 31 U.S.C § 3730(c)(2)(A) (2022).
157. CIMZNHCA II, 970 F.3d at 849.
158. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i) (2022).
159. CIMZNHCA II, 970 F.3d at 849.
160. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A) (2022).
161. Washington Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Mass. Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co., 922
F.2d 92, 97 (2d Cir. 1990) (“[i]ntervention cannot be used as a means to inject
collateral issues into an existing action”).
162. 31 U.S.C § 3730(c)(2)(A) (2022).
163. CIMZNHCA II, 970 F.3d at 850.
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has been notified and “the court has provided the [relator] with an
opportunity for a hearing on the motion.”164 This hearing
requirement lies at the crux of the disagreement over the court’s
role in reviewing the Government’s efforts to dismiss an FCA
claim.165 While the Swift court construed this provision as simply
providing the relator a “formal opportunity to convince the
government not to end the case,”166 the Sequoia Orange court
interpreted this section as requiring the Government to justify its
decision to seek dismissal.167
The Seventh Circuit offered another novel interpretation of the
FCA by explaining the hearing requirement may only be invoked in
“exceptional cases” that look for government misconduct and
violations of Due Process.168 The Court determined the hearing only
applies in cases where the Government has missed its chance to
dismiss the case,169 and the relator has refused to agree to
dismissal.170 In that case, a hearing under section 3730(c)(2)(A)171
would be used to decide what “terms” of dismissal are proper under
Rule 41(a)(2).172 In sum, the Seventh Circuit’s new standard gives
the Government great deference in dismissing the lawsuit, and the
164. 31 U.S.C § 3730(c)(2)(A) (2022).
165. Cf. Swift, 318 F.3d at 253 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (ruling that the FCA’s
hearing requirement does not require judicial review of the Government’s
decision to dismiss a case, it instead “give[s] the relator a formal opportunity to
convince the government not to end the case”); cf. also Sequoia Orange, 151 F.3d
1139, 1145 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding support for a rational-relation standard of
review from S.Rep. No. 99–345, at 26 (1986), which describes the appropriate
circumstances for invoking the hearing requirement of 31 U.S.C. §
3730(c)(2)(A)).
166. Swift, 318 F.3d at 253.
167. Sequoia Orange, 151 F.3d at 1147.
168. UCB, Inc., 970 F.3d at 851-52; see also Sequoia Orange, 151 F.3d at
1146 (citing U.S. v. Redondo-Lemos, 955 F.2d 1296, 1298-99 (9th Cir. 1992)
(“due process prohibits arbitrary or irrational prosecutorial decisions.”)).
169. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i) (2022) (“The plaintiff may dismiss an
action without a court order by filling . . . a notice of dismissal before the
opposing party serves either an answer or a motion for summary judgement.”).
170. CIMZNHCA II, 970 F.3d at 850; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) (2022)
(“The plaintiff may dismiss an action without a court order by filling . . . a
stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared.”).
171. 31 U.S.C § 3730(c)(2)(A) (2022) (“The Government may dismiss the
action notwithstanding the objections of the person initiating the action if the
person has been notified by the Government of the filing of the motion and the
court has provided the person with an opportunity for a hearing on the
motion.”).
172. CIMZNHCA II, 970 F.3d at 850; ssee Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A) (2022)
(“an action may be dismissed at the plaintiff's request only by court order, on
terms that the court considers proper.”); cf. Swift, 318 F.3d at 252-53 (“If the
government tried to have an action dismissed after the complaint had
been served and the defendant answered, it might be subject to Rule 41(a)(2),
which requires an order of the court upon such terms and conditions as the court
deems proper.”) (internal quotations omitted).
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Government’s decision will only be questioned in “exceptional
cases”173 where the relator invokes the hearing requirement of
section 3730(c)(2)(A).174

D. Merits of the Case
Before applying its newly constructed standard, the Seventh
Circuit took another opportunity to criticize the reasoning of the
Sequoia Orange175 court. Contrary to Sequoia Orange,176 the
Seventh Circuit noted the Government in the present case did not
exceed the limitations of its powers when moving to dismiss the
lawsuit without articulating a cost/benefit analysis of CIMZNHCA’s
lawsuit.177 The Court explained that “[n]o constitutional or
statutory directive imposes such a requirement. None is found in
the False Claims Act. The government is not required to justify its
litigation decisions in this way.”178 Ironically, in a possible moment
of self-realization, the Court hints towards a possible solution that
would avoid this arduous statutory interpretation by stating: “If
Congress wishes to require some extra-constitutional minimum of
fairness, reasonableness, or adequacy of the government's decision
. . . it will need to say so.”179
Nevertheless, the Court disagreed with the idea that the
Government’s actions fell short of the “rationally related” standard
of Sequoia Orange180 as it relates to a substantive Due Process
violation.181 Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit held the
Government’s decision to dismiss the case was rational and
constitutional.182 Therefore, the decision of the district court was
173. CIMZNHCA II, 970 F.3d at 851-52.
174. 31 U.S.C § 3730(c)(2)(A) (2022).
175. Sequoia Orange, 151 F.3d at 1147.
176. Id.
177. CIMZNHCA II, 970 F.3d at 852 (“The district court faulted the
government for having failed to make a particularized dollar-figure estimate of
the potential costs and benefits of CIMZNHCA's lawsuit, as opposed to the more
general review of the Venari companies’ activities undertaken and described by
the government.”).
178. CIMZNHCA II, 970 F.3d at 852.
179. Id. at 853.
180. Sequoia Orange, 151 F.3d at 1147.
181. CIMZNHCA II, 970 F.3d at 852; see County of Sacramento v. Lewis,
523 U.S. 833, 847 (1998) (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 128
(1992) (“[T]he Due Process Clause is violated by executive action only when it
‘can properly be characterized as arbitrary, or conscience shocking, in a
constitutional sense.’)); see also Rosales-Mireles v. U.S., 138 S. Ct. 1897, 1906
(2018) (quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at 847 (explaining when a government interest
intentionally causes an injury in an unjustifiable way, it is said to have
“shock[ed] the conscience” and violated the Due Process Clause)).
182. CIMZNHCA II, 970 F.3d at 852 (explaining that the Government’s
decision to dismiss this lawsuit relied on the insight of “nine cited agency
guidances, advisory opinions, and final rulemakings [that have] consistently
held that the conduct complained of is probably lawful. Not only lawful, but
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reversed, and the case was remanded with instructions to dismiss
the claims “with prejudice as to the relator and without prejudice
as to the government.”183

E. Concurrence
Judge Scudder concurred in the judgment, writing that he did
not see a need to delve into a sophisticated analysis as to what
standard of review section 3730(c)(2)(A)184 calls for when the
Government moves to dismiss a case.185 Rather, he felt “the
Government’s dismissal request easily satisfied rational basis
review.”186 Judge Scudder preferred to address this issue in a case
that would be determined on the outcome of “whether principles of
constitutional avoidance should play any role in a question of
statutory interpretation under the [FCA].”187

F. Effects of the Case
From now on In the Seventh Circuit, the Government’s motion
to dismiss a qui tam action under section 3730(c)(2)(A)188 will first
require a motion to intervene under section 3730(c)(3).189 As for the
process of review, the Seventh Circuit’s ruling departs from the
“unfettered discretion” standard of Swift190 and the “rational
relation test” of Sequoia Orange,191 but nonetheless falls nearer to
Swift. The Government maintains an unfettered right to dismiss an
FCA claim, if it files a motion to dismiss before the defendant has
“filed an answer or motion for summary judgment,” pursuant to
Rule 41(a)(1).192 If the Government wishes to dismiss the case after
the defendant has taken either of these two actions, it may only

beneficial to patients and the public”).
183. CIMZNHCA II, 970 F.3d at 854.
184. 31 U.S.C § 3730(c)(2)(A) (2022).
185. CIMZNHCA II, 970 F.3d at 856 (Scudder, J., concurring).
186. Id.; see FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314-15
(1993) (underscoring that the rational basis standard requires “a paradigm of
judicial restraint” and indeed ruling out “every conceivable basis” otherwise
supporting the challenged measure).
187. CIMZNHCA II, 970 F.3d at 856 (Scudder, J., concurring).
188. 31 U.S.C § 3730(c)(2)(A) (2022).
189. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3) (2022).
190. Swift, 318 F.3d at 251.
191. Sequoia Orange, 151 F.3d at 1147.
192. CIMZNHCA II, 970 F.3d at 849 (quoting Smith v. Potter, 513 F.3d 781,
782–83 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding “once a valid Rule 41(a) notice has been served,
‘the case [is] gone; no action remain[s] for the district judge to take,’ and her
further orders are void.”)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a) (2022) (allowing a
plaintiff to unilaterally dismiss the case before a defendant files an answer or
motion for summary judgement).
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intervene for “good cause,” pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3).193
Ultimately, the Government’s motion to dismiss under section
3730(c)(2)(A)194 which precedes the Rule 41(a)(1)195 requirement,
will typically be granted unless “the Government’s conduct . . .
bump[s] up against the Rules, the statute, or the Constitution.”196
With now three competing standards, future battles in the
courts are imminent over which standard should apply in
jurisdictions that have yet to adopt one. With multiple FCA
attorneys across the country predicting this issue may reach the
Supreme Court,197 it is clear that changes to the procedural
requirements of FCA dismissal review are needed. Rather than
continue the debate over interpreting the existing text of the
statute, in the following section, I will propose a simpler solution,
amending the text of the FCA itself to create a unified standard of
review.

IV. PERSONAL ANALYSIS
This section will cover a proposal for a new standard of review
for the Government’s dismissal of FCA claims that requires an
amendment of the FCA statute to create a procedure that is
consistent with the legislative intent and central objectives of the
act. First, this section will examine the problems with the new
standard created by the Seventh Circuit, followed by an analysis of
how Congress’ original intent behind the FCA’s procedures is
incompatible with the current circuit court split over the
Government’s responsibilities when dismissing FCA claims. This
section will conclude with a proposal for a new standard for
dismissing FCA claims which will require the Government to show
the court it has conducted a thorough investigation into the claim,
193. CIMZNHCA II, 970 F.3d at 848; see 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3) (2022)
(“When a person proceeds with the action, the court, without limiting the status
and rights of the person initiating the action, may nevertheless permit the
Government to intervene at a later date upon a showing of good cause”).
194. 31 U.S.C § 3730(c)(2)(A) (2022).
195. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a) (2022).
196. CIMZNCHA II, 970 F.3d at 853.
197. Laurence Freedman et al., Seventh Circuit Adds to Circuit Split Over
Standard for DOJ Dismissals in FCA Cases, MINTZ (Aug. 26, 2020),
www.mintz.com/insights-center/viewpoints/2146/2020-08-25-seventh-circuitadds-circuit-split-over-standard-doj [perma.cc/4TTE-4JK9] (“Due to the
disputed standard for dismissal, the jurisdictional issue, and the Seventh
Circuit’s novel approach to both, there is an increasing chance that these issues
might attract the attention of the Supreme Court”); see also Mike Theis &
Stacey Hadeka, The CIMNHCA decision: A third standard for DOJ dismissals,
HOGAN LOVELLS (last visited Mar. 3, 2022) fca-2021.hoganlovellsabc.com/2020and-the-road-ahead/lessons-from-polansky-the-continuing-assault-on-subregulatory-guidance [perma.cc/L5TS-549G] (“there now exist three different
approaches to DOJ dismissals under the FCA, and there is an opportunity for
yet additional splits, or Supreme Court review”).

2022]

CIMZNHCA v. UCB

476

as well as a cost-benefit analysis for deciding whether the claim is
worth pursuing.

A. Problems with the “CIMZNCHA” Standard
The Seventh Circuit’s new standard for dismissal creates an
opportunity for unforeseen issues that will create more contentious
disputes early on in FCA litigation. First, this standard now gives
relators two instances to challenge the Government’s decision, at
the motion to intervene and the motion to dismiss, which will lead
to extended litigation. More importantly, the “exceptional cases”198
standard for invoking the hearing requirement of section
3730(c)(2)(A)199 may still leave room for a violation of the relator’s
Due Process rights as a “partial assignee”200 to the FCA action. It is
foreseeable that relators will argue that their constitutional rights
are violated when the Government fails to “diligently [ ]
investigate”201 their claims, as is required by the FCA.202 The
language in the Seventh Circuit’s opinion does not describe when
the Government has satisfied its investigative duties, which notably
is something the district court and the appellate court in
CIMZNHCA v. UCB disagreed on.203

198. CIMZNCHA II, 970 F.3d at 852.
199. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A) (2022).
200. See Assignment, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019)
(“An assignment is a transfer . . . of property, or of some right or interest therein,
from one person to another.”); cf. id. (“partial assignment [is] [t]he immediate
transfer of part but not all of the assignor’s right”); see Vermont Agency of Nat.
Resources v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 774 n.4 (2000) (concluding
relators have standing to bring an FCA claim as “partial assignees” because the
statute gives relators a right of partial assignment to the Government’s
damages claims.); see also 28 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) (2022) (“If the Government
proceeds with an action brought by a [relator], such person shall . . . receive at
least 15 percent but not more than 25 percent of the proceeds of the action or
settlement of the claim.”).
201. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a) (2022).
202. Nathan T. Tschepik, The Executive Judgment Rule: A New Standard of
Dismissal for Qui Tam Suits Under the False Claims Act, 87 U. CHI. L. REV,
1053, 1075-76 (2020) (arguing that as a partial assignee, the relator may claim
its due process rights have been violated when the Government deprives the
relator’s property right by dismissing the case without adhering to the
investigation requirements of the FCA).
203. CIMZNHCA II, 970 F.3d 835, 852 (7th Cir. 2020) (“We must disagree
with the suggestion that the government's decision here fell short of the bare
rationality standard borrowed by Sequoia Orange from substantive due process
cases.”); contra CIMZNHCA I, 2019 WL 1598109, at *3 (stating the
Government’s investigation into the FCA claim “falls short of a minimally
adequate investigation to support the claimed governmental purpose”).
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B. The Standards Articulated in CIMZNCHA and Swift
Do Not Comport with the Legislative Intent Behind the
FCA
The main disagreement between the circuit courts is centered
around how much deference the Government should receive when
it seeks to dismiss a qui tam action. While Swift204 and
CIMZNHCA205 give the Government a nearly “unfettered right” to
dismiss these claims, Sequoia Orange requires the Government to
provide a “rational relation” between dismissal and a valid
government purpose.206 The root cause of this three-way circuit
court split can be attributed to varying interpretations of the FCA
statute itself.207 Therefore, in order to determine how courts should
apply the statute when considering the government’s motion to
dismiss, it follows that the analysis should begin with Congress’
objectives behind the FCA.
As discussed in Part II of this case note, Congress amended the
FCA in 1986 to encourage relator participation in aiding the
Government with combating fraud, by increasing incentives and
giving the relator a more prominent role in the litigation.208
Examining the legislative history of this amendment found in
Senate Report Number 99–345 provides the necessary insight for
resolving how courts should review dismissals of FCA claims. 209
Adopting an “unfettered right”210 standard or a standard
derived from Fed. R. Civ. P. 41211 for dismissal, as set forth in
Swift212 and CIMZNHCA,213 would ignore Congress’ intent that
“only a coordinated effort of both the Government and the citizenry”
can combat fraud.214 Allowing the Government to dismiss a qui tam
action over the objections of a relator defeats the purpose of the FCA

204. Swift, 318 F.3d at 252.
205. CIMZNHCA II, 970 F.3d at 845.
206. Sequoia Orange, 151 F.3d at 1147.
207. See id. at 1143 (determining, “the issue is one of statutory
interpretation.”); contra CIMZNHCA II, 970 F.3d at 838 (noting “[t]he Act does
not indicate how, if at all, the district court is to review the government's
decision to dismiss”); see generally Swift, 318 F.3d at 252, (rejecting the Sequoia
Orange interpretation of the FCA and electing to adopt its own).
208. S. Rep. No. 99-345 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. §§ 5266, 5291
(“The bill also allows a qui tam, or private citizen relator, increased involvement
in suits brought by the relator but litigated by the Government. Additionally,
the relator could receive up to 30 percent of any judgment arising from his suit
and is afforded protection from retaliation for his actions.”).
209. Id.
210. Swift, 318 F.3d at 252.
211. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A) (2022).
212. Swift, 318 F.3d at 252.
213. CIMZNHCA II, 970 F.3d at 853.
214. S. Rep. No. 99-345 at 2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266,
5291 (emphasis added).
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amendments in that it completely undermines the relator’s
involvement in the suit. This is especially problematic when the
relator has legitimate evidence of fraud, or the Government has
failed to fully investigate the claims.
It is worth noting that unlike the Swift215 standard, the
CIMZNHCA216 standard leaves room for a hearing pursuant to
section 3730(c)(2)(A),217 which allows the relator to raise its
objections to dismissal.218 However, under the CIMZNHCA
standard, dismissal of a qui tam action will most likely be granted
unless “the government’s conduct bump[s] up against the Rules, the
statute, or the Constitution.”219 Although the CIMZNHCA220
standard provides more deference to relators as compared to the
Swift standard,221 this standard of review does not align with the
legislative history of the FCA.
Senate Report Number 99–345 specifically addressed the
hearing requirement of section 3730(c)(2)(A).222 The report notes
that a hearing is appropriate “if the relator presents a colorable
claim that the . . . dismissal is unreasonable in light of existing
evidence, that the Government has not fully investigated the
allegations, or that the Government's decision was based on
arbitrary or improper considerations.”223 Accordingly, the
CIMZNHCA224 standard of review falls short of Congress’ intention
behind the hearing requirement of section 3730(c)(2)(A)225 because
simply reserving a hearing for “exceptional cases”226 is objectively
vague and does not address instances of insufficient investigations.
215. Swift, 318 F.3d at 252.
216. CIMZNHCA II, 970 F.3d at 853.
217. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A) (2022) (“The Government may dismiss the
action notwithstanding the objections of the person initiating the action if the
person has been notified by the Government of the filing of the motion and the
court has provided the person with an opportunity for a hearing on the
motion.”).
218. CIMZNHCA II, 970 F.3d at 853.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Swift, 318 F.3d at 252.
222. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A) (2022) (“The Government may dismiss the
action notwithstanding the objections of the person initiating the action if the
person has been notified by the Government of the filing of the motion and the
court has provided the person with an opportunity for a hearing on the
motion.”).
223. S.Rep. No. 99–345, at 26 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. §§
5266, 5291.
224. CIMZNHCA II, 970 F.3d at 853.
225. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A) (2022) (“The Government may dismiss the
action notwithstanding the objections of the person initiating the action if the
person has been notified by the Government of the filing of the motion and the
court has provided the person with an opportunity for a hearing on the
motion.”).
226. CIMZNHCA II, 970 F.3d at 852.
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Therefore, a standard that is consistent with the legislative intent
of the FCA should require the Government to show that it has fully
investigated the allegations and provide a rational basis for
dismissal that is not arbitrary or insufficiently considered.
As mentioned in Part II, the Senate Report behind the 1986
amendments of the FCA specifically addressed the importance of
the relator’s involvement in qui tam actions. The report states that
section 3730(c)(2)227 “provides qui tam plaintiffs with a more direct
role . . . in acting as a check that the Government does not neglect
evidence, cause undue delay, or drop the false claims case without
legitimate reason.”228 There is no question that Congress intended
relators to exercise their statutory right of raising objections to the
Government’s dismissal by forcing the Government to consider
legitimate evidence and state rational grounds for its decisions.
Allowing the Government to prevent relators from exercising this
right would undermine this fundamental objective of the FCA.
Furthermore, the text of the FCA itself reinforces Congress’
intent of requiring the Government to show a rational reason for
dismissing the action. Section 3730(a) states that the “Attorney
General diligently shall investigate a violation under [the FCA].”229
Clearly, allowing the Government to dismiss a qui tam action
without a showing of a diligent investigation, as CIMZNHCA230 and
Swift231 would suggest, does not comport with the express text of
the FCA. Moreover, section 3730(b)(1) explicitly requires the
Attorney General and the court to give written consent and their
reasoning for doing so, before an FCA action may be dismissed.232 If
the Government were able to unilaterally dismiss an action without
showing its reasoning, section 3730(b)(1) of the FCA would be
rendered meaningless.

C. Proposal
The circuit court split over this issue attempts to interpret a
standard of review for dismissal from a statute that is objectively
unclear on the matter. The circuit courts’ analysis is focused on
constitutional concerns and case law regarding the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, which must comport with the explicit text of the
FCA.233 However, it seems that the competing standards of review

227. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(1) (2022).
228. S.Rep. No. 99–345, at 25–26 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. §§
5266, 5291.
229. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(a) (2022).
230. CIMZNHCA II, 970 F.3d at 852.
231. Swift, 318 F.3d at 252.
232. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (2022) (“The action may be dismissed only if the
court and the Attorney General give written consent to the dismissal and their
reasons for consenting.”).
233. See generally Sequoia Orange, 151 F.3d at 1145 (explaining that the
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have fallen short of the standard that Congress originally intended
when it passed the most recent version of the FCA.
Therefore, this issue can only be resolved by amending the
statute to require courts to follow a clear standard that provides
adequate due process to relators and is consistent with the
objectives of the FCA.
The FCA should be amended to include a requirement that the
Government must show that it has made a thorough investigation
into an FCA claim before it moves to dismiss it. This requirement
ensures that all relevant evidence and the merits of the claim are
adequately considered, rather than allowing the Government to
avoid this analysis by raising vague concerns about resources and
Government prerogatives.
Support for requiring the Government to provide adequate
reasoning for its decision to dismiss a claim can be found beyond the
text of the FCA and the legislative history behind the act. Senator
Chuck Grassley, the Congressman who spearheaded the 1986
amendments to the FCA,234 has recently endorsed the idea of
holding the Government responsible for showing its rationale for
seeking dismissal in FCA actions.235 As a result of the Granston
Memo’s directive236 to increase the Government’s pursuit of seeking
dismissals of FCA claims,237 Senator Grassley released a public
memo directed at former Attorney General William Barr, in which
Grassley expressed his concerns over the Government’s dismissal
power in FCA cases.238
Senator Grassley noted that the DOJ’s reasons for seeking
dismissals of FCA claims “appear primarily unrelated to the merits
of individual cases” and that “[s]uch actions could undermine the
purpose of the False Claims Act by discouraging whistleblowers and
“rational relation test” will avoid separation of powers concerns); Swift, 318
F.3d at 252 (reasoning that its interpretation of the FCA that gives the
Government an unfettered right to dismiss a claim is “consistent with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”); CIMZNHCA II, 970 F.3d at 846-49
(addressing constitutional concerns raised by several courts over conditioning
the Government’s right to dismiss an FCA claim by intervening upon a showing
of good cause).
234. A Brief History of the False Claims Act, GOLDBERG KOHN LTD (Aug. 2,
2021), www.whistleblowersattorneys.com/blogs-whistleblowerblog,history-ofthe-false-claims-act [perma.cc/F99K-WK5M].
235. Letter from Charles E. Grassley, United States Senator, to William
Barr, Attorney General, U.S. Dept. of Justice (Sept. 4, 2019),
www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-questions-use-dojmemo-limit-recovery-tax-dollars-lost-fraud [perma.cc/H2K3-JLHE].
236. Factors for Evaluating Dismissal, supra note 11 at 2.
237. See Davis, supra note 59 (“[During the thirty years before the Granston
Memo, the government moved to dismiss roughly 45 qui tam cases; in the twoplus years following the memo, the Department has moved to dismiss around
50 qui tams”)
238. Letter from Charles E. Grassley, supra note 235.
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dismissing potentially serious fraud on the taxpayers.”239 Senator
Grassley proceeded to express his concerns with Government’s
decision to dismiss recent FCA claims, including CIMZNHCA v.
UCB,240 where he noted that the “DOJ did not thoroughly
investigate a case it argued lacked merit; argued for dismissal on
policy grounds while admitting the claims present a classic violation
of law; and finally, failed to do a cost-benefit analysis while arguing
that litigation would be too costly.”241
Senator Grassley’s suggestion for a cost-benefit analysis
should also be incorporated into the FCA in order to address all
relevant issues as to whether the claim is worth pursuing. This
requirement would work to serve the interests of both the
Government and the relator. The relator will be provided with a
comprehensive explanation of why its claim is not worth pursuing,
and the Government will be able to sufficiently explain its decision
to dismiss, without raising due process concerns for the relator. This
proposed standard not only renders the UCB242 and Swift243
holdings obsolete but also goes a step past the Sequoia Orange244
standard. The proposed amendment would require the Government
to lay out a cost-benefit analysis for pursuing the claim and explain
every detail of its reasoning behind seeking dismissal, rather than
limiting its decision to finding a “rational relation” to a valid
government purpose.

D. CIMZNHCA Outcome Under the Proposed Standard
Had the Seventh Circuit applied this proposed standard in
CIMZNHCA, the Court almost certainly would have agreed with
the district court, in that the Government failed to meet its burden
to dismiss this FCA claim. Rather than investigate the specific
merits of the case at hand, the Government admitted that it had
instead collectively analyzed the eleven qui tam actions filed by the
NHCA Group.245 Although the Government acknowledged that the
Medicare/Medicaid reimbursement scheme allegedly perpetrated
by UCB, Inc. demonstrated a “classic violation”246 of the AntiKickback Statute, 247 the Government instead devoted 6.5 pages of
its briefing and all of its exhibits to attack NHCA Group’s business
model.248 Further, the Government did not investigate any

239. Id.
240. CIMZNHCA II, 970 F.3d at 853.
241. Letter from Charles E. Grassley, supra note 235.
242. CIMZNHCA II, 970 F.3d at 853.
243. Swift, 318 F.3d at 252.
244. Sequoia Orange, 151 F.3d at 1147.
245. CIMZNHCA I, 2019 WL 1598109, at *3.
246. CIMZNHCA I, 2019 WL 1598109, at *4.
247. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b).
248. CIMZNHCA I, 2019 WL 1598109, at *3.
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additional materials that were not attached to the Complaint filed
by CIMZNCHA, LLC. 249 Clearly, the Government’s decision to
dismiss this case was not based on the merits of the FCA claim, and
the Government failed to adequately analyze whether these serious
allegations were at all true.
The Government would have also fallen short of its burden
under the proposed standard because it failed to conduct a
meaningful cost-benefit analysis. The alleged kick-back scheme
implicated thousands of healthcare professionals, and potentially
involved tens of millions of dollars in taxpayer money stolen from
the Government.250 Here, the Government failed to analyze exactly
how much it would cost to litigate these serious claims and did not
even consider how much money it could have recovered.251 With
such a significant amount of money at stake, the Government’s
decision to dismiss the claim after conducting a perfunctory
investigation flies in the face of the FCA’s objective to seriously
consider every claim and ensure that legitimate fraud is not
overlooked.

V. CONCLUSION
The purpose of enacting the False Claims Act was not only to
fight fraud against the Government but more importantly to
empower American citizens to step out against fraud and allow
their claims to be heard. The new standard for dismissal of FCA
claims developed in CIMZNCHA v. UCB252 as well as the existing
standards from the Ninth253 and D.C. circuits,254 fail to adequately
enable relators to have their claims sufficiently considered.
Amending the FCA to require the Government to diligently
investigate FCA claims and show the reasoning behind their
decisions is consistent with the original objectives of the FCA and
will prevent the Government from impeding relators’ ability to
bring serious fraud to light.
Requiring thorough consideration of FCA claims will prevent
discouraging whistleblowers who have legitimate claims but
require further investigation by the Government to uncover alleged
scams and prevent serious fraud from being overlooked.
Empowering whistleblowers is the key to preventing fraud against
the Government. Once we take these steps to change our current
system for evaluating whistleblower claims, our country will be

249. Id.
250. Id. at *1.
251. Id.
252. CIMZNHCA II, 970 F.3d at 853.
253. Id.
254. Swift, 318 F.3d 252.
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adequately prepared to fight fraud, save millions of tax dollars, and
protect the courageous men and women who risk their lives to
eradicate crime against the Government.

